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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Express Services, Inc. ("Express") appeals from the order 
of the District Court granting judgment following a bench 
trial to Careers Express Staffing Services and Tammy M. 
Ford d/b/a Careers Express (collectively, "Careers 
Express"). 
 
I. 
 
Both Express and Careers Express provide temporary 
and permanent employment agency services to secretaries 
and clerical workers in Chester, Montgomery, Delaware, 
Bucks, and Philadelphia counties. 
 
Express, which operates in Pennsylvania primarily under 
the name EXPRESS PERSONNEL SERVICE, owns a series 
of trademarks and service marks, including inter alia 
EXPRESS, EXPRESS and Design, EXPRESS PERSONNEL 
SERVICE and Design, EXPRESS TEMPORARY SERVICE 
and Design, and EXPRESS STAFFING SERVICES and 
Design. (The denomination "and Design" signifies that the 
preceding words are accompanied by a figure that depicts 
a person walking.) The Express marks have all been 
registered federally, and the mark EXPRESS PERSONNEL 
SERVICE and Design was registered with the state of 
Pennsylvania on or about June 15, 1990. 
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Careers Express operates in Pennsylvania under the 
mark CAREERS EXPRESS. It owns neither a federal 
registration nor a Pennsylvania state registration for that 
mark, which it first used in commerce on April 4, 1994, 
although it registered the fictitious name CAREERS 
EXPRESS in Pennsylvania in April 1994. The parties have 
stipulated that they "use their respective marks in the same 
or similar channels of trade" and provide services to "the 
same classes of customers." 
 
Careers Express first learned of the existence of Express's 
marks in or around 1994, when it commissioned a 
trademark availability study. Based on the results of this 
study, Careers Express's counsel advised it that use of the 
CAREERS EXPRESS mark probably would be permissible, 
the marks of Express notwithstanding. 
 
Express first became aware of Careers Express's 
operations in 1996. It objected to the CAREERS EXPRESS 
mark on February 12, 1996. On March 10, 1997, it brought 
suit in federal court. Express claims that use of the name 
CAREERS EXPRESS infringes its trademarks and service 
marks. 
 
Careers Express responded by moving for summary 
judgment on March 19, 1997. The next day, Express moved 
for summary judgment, based in part on a series of 
affidavits. The District Court denied both motions by Order 
dated July 1, 1997 and scheduled the case for trial on 
September 17, 1997. At trial, Express did not call any 
witnesses, electing instead to rely on its affidavits. Careers 
Express elicited the testimony of its own witnesses, as well 
as that of several of the individuals whose affidavits 
Express had submitted. 
 
The District Court entered judgment for Careers Express 
on October 22, 1997. The same day, Express moved for 
reconsideration, or in the alternative for a new trial. 
Express also sought to supplement the record with several 
new affidavits, which addressed the advertising practices of 
its franchisees. The District Court denied these motions on 
December 17, 1997, and Express filed a timely appeal. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review 
of the District Court's conclusions of law is plenary. See 
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Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 
1438 (3d Cir. 1994). We review the factual determination 
whether there is a likelihood of confusion for clear error. 
See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 
1995). "Clear error exists when, giving all deference to the 
opportunity of the trial judge to evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses and to weigh the evidence, we are `left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.' " A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret 
Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). 
 
II. 
 
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act states: 
 
       Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
       registrant -- 
 
       (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, 
       copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in 
       connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, 
       or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
       connection with which such use is likely to cause 
       confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; . . . shall 
       be liable in a civil action by the registrant. . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1114(1). 
 
In order to establish infringement of its trademark, the 
trademark owner must prove that "(1) the mark is valid and 
legally protectable; (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff; 
and (3) the defendant's use of the mark to identify goods or 
services is likely to create confusion concerning the origins 
of the goods or services." Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro 
Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1994); see also A&H 
Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 
197, 205 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that "the appropriate 
standard for determining trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act is the likelihood of confusion"). If a mark is 
both federally registered and "incontestible," see 15 U.S.C. 
SS 1058, 1065, the mark is presumed to meet the first two 
requirements. 
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Express contends that the District Court erred when it 
determined that there was no likelihood of confusion 
between its marks and that of Careers Express. Because we 
conclude that the District Court improperly characterized 
the Express marks and because this error may have 
affected the District Court's likelihood-of-confusion 
analysis, we will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
A. 
 
This court has recognized that trademark terms may fall 
within one of four categories: 
 
       arbitrary (or fanciful) terms, which bear "no logical or 
       suggestive relation to the actual characteristics of the 
       goods;" suggestive terms, which suggest rather than 
       describe the characteristics of the goods; descriptive 
       terms, which describe a characteristic or ingredient of 
       the article to which it refers, and generic terms, which 
       function as the common descriptive name of a product 
       class. 
 
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 
1986) (citation omitted). 
 
The District Court found that " `express' and `services' are 
generic descriptive terms." As the passage quoted above 
explains, "generic" and "descriptive" are separate categories. 
Moreover, these categories have different implications for 
trademark analysis. If a term is generic, it is not entitled to 
trademark protection, whereas a descriptive term may be 
entitled to some protection if it has acquired a secondary 
meaning. See id. at 292. 
 
Thus, the District Court's characterization of EXPRESS 
and SERVICES as generic descriptive was clear error. In 
fact, we believe it is questionable that the Express marks 
fall within either the descriptive or the generic category. The 
record contains no evidence that consumers view express 
employment agency services as a genus of employment 
agency services in the way that they might, for example, 
distinguish temporary employment agency services from 
permanent employment agency services. Indeed, there is no 
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evidence in the record to suggest that Express's services 
differ from the general class of employment agency services 
"in a significant, functional, characteristic." See id. at 293. 
 
For similar reasons, a reasonable factfinder might doubt 
that the term "express" is descriptive in this context. For 
example, The American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed. 
1993) provides three definitions for the word "express" 
when used as an adjective, 
 
       1. Definitely and explicitly stated. 2. Particular; 
       specific. 3.a. Sent out with or moving at high speed. b. 
       Direct, rapid, and usu[ally] nonstop: an express bus c. 
       Of, relating to, or appropriate for rapid travel: express 
       lanes. 
 
None of these applies to the provision of employment 
agency services without interposing considerable 
imagination or modification. The term "express" certainly 
does connote speed when applied to travel or transport, as 
the third of the above definitions demonstrates. Applying 
that term outside of those contexts, however, requires an 
imaginative leap that may be large enough to transform 
"express" from descriptive to merely suggestive. 
 
B. 
 
We cannot conclude that the District Court's 
inappropriate characterization of the Express marks was 
harmless error. Where, as in this case, goods or services 
directly compete, "the court need rarely look beyond the 
mark itself " to determine whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion. Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 
(3d Cir. 1983). Therefore, the nature of the marks was, or 
should have been, the District Court's primary focus. 
 
The District Court's erroneous classification of Express's 
mark impacted its determination of the mark's strength, 
see Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 
486, 491 (2d Cir. 1988) ("the category in which the mark 
qualifies -- generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary -- 
is useful in determining its strength"), and therefore 
affected its decision regarding likelihood of confusion, see 
Express Services, Inc. v. Careers Express Staffing Servs., 
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No. 96-7291, slip op. at 7-8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997) (listing 
strength of mark as factor in determining likelihood of 
confusion); accord 721 F.2d at 463. Indeed, the District 
Court explicitly stated that it was "[t]he commonality of the 
words `express' and `service' " that led it "to conclude that 
plaintiff 's marks are weak and entitled to limited 
protection." Express Services, No. 96-7291, slip op. at 9. 
The characterization of Express's marks as "generic 
descriptive" thus may have decreased the District Court's 
willingness to find that Express had met its burden of 
proving a likelihood of confusion. 
 
We do not suggest that the District Court's conclusion 
that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of 
confusion between the marks could not be sustained. The 
parties stipulated that there was no actual confusion, and 
the plaintiff introduced nothing but affidavits to attempt to 
sustain its burden to show likelihood of confusion by a 
preponderance of the evidence. However, in light of the 
District Court's improper characterization of these marks, 
we cannot be certain that the result would have been the 
same absent the District Court's error. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand so 
that the District Court may reconsider whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion between the parties' marks. The 
District Court may, if it believes it necessary, take 
additional evidence, but we do not require it to do so if it 
believes the record is adequate. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                7 
